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West: Proof of Objective Falsehood

PROOF OF OBJECTIVE FALSEHOOD: LIABILITY UNDER THE
FALSE CLAIMS ACT FOR HOSPICE PROVIDERS
Sebastian West

I. INTRODUCTION
Hospice care can offer important end-of-life services for individuals
suffering from terminal illnesses, such as palliative care and the
opportunity to spend one’s final days in the company of loved ones.1
Hospice care enables individuals to reflect on their lives and helps them
transition to the next chapter. Medicare coverage for hospice care is
available to individuals certified as terminally ill.2 To certify patients as
terminally ill, Congress requires physicians to exercise their clinical
judgment based on clinical information and supporting medical
documentation.3 When individuals are falsely or fraudulently certified,
private citizens can file claims under the False Claims Act to recoup
payment for services fraudulently billed to Medicare.4 Nevertheless,
courts struggle to create a standard for determining whether a certification
is false or fraudulent.
This Note discusses the requisite legal standard individuals must satisfy
when claiming hospice providers violated the False Claims Act. Although
the Eleventh and Third Circuits have addressed this issue, they applied
different standards. This Note argues that the Eleventh Circuit’s approach
is the appropriate standard regarding the burden of production required at
the summary judgment stage in these lawsuits.
Section II of this Note discusses the Medicare Health Benefit, the False
Claims Act, and lower court decisions that influenced the Eleventh
Circuit’s holding in United States v. Aseracare. Section III addresses the
circuit split and discusses how the “objective falsehood” standard has
been interpreted to prove liability under the False Claims Act. Section IV
argues that the standard adopted by the Eleventh Circuit is adequate but
cautions that it fails to sufficiently guide the lower courts. Next, Section
IV recommends that courts should analyze falsity under the Medicare
Health Benefit’s (“MHB’s”) reasonable and necessary standard to decide
if hospice providers falsely certified patients. Finally, Part V
contemplates whether courts need a new legal standard to apply to false
hospice certification suits filed under the False Claims Act.
1. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: REFORMING THE
DELIVERY SYSTEM 207 (June 2008).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. 31 U.S.C. §3730(b).
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II. BACKGROUND
Hospice programs provide quality, compassionate care for individuals
facing terminal illness.5 Because individuals forego curative treatment
when they enroll in hospice care,6 hospice provides a holistic approach to
end-of-life care.7 Individuals seeking hospice treatment through
Medicare, however, must satisfy regulatory requirements and be certified
as terminally ill by a physician. Although most certifications are proper,
the government can challenge the certification in a civil action under the
False Claims Act (“FCA”) against hospice providers who billed
Medicare. This Section discusses the MHB, the False Claims Act, and
other lower court decisions laying the groundwork for the Eleventh and
Third Circuit’s split over the appropriate legal standard to survive a
motion for summary judgment when the government alleges the hospice
provider violated the FCA because a physician falsely certified a patient
as terminally ill.
A. Medicare Hospice Benefit
In 1983, Congress established the MHB,8 which designated the Center
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) to promulgate rules and
administer the MHB.9 Under the rules, MHB allows CMS to pay private
hospice care providers for their services rendered.10 Understanding
individuals’ changing needs surrounding end-of-life care, Congress
enacted the MHB and recognized that impending death warrants a change
from curative to palliative treatment.11 Thus, hospice care helps
“terminally ill individuals continue life with minimal disruption to normal
activities while remaining primarily in the home environment.”12
To be eligible for hospice care, an individual must be certified as

5. NATIONAL HOSPICE AND PALLIATIVE CARE ORGANIZATION, FACTS AND FIGURES 2 (2020
ed.,August 20, 2020) [hereinafter NHPCO, Facts and Figures].
6. Medicare Program; Proposed Hospice Wage Index for Fiscal Year 2010, 74 Fed, Reg. 18912
(Apr. 24, 2009) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §418.22(b)(3)).
7. See NHPCO, Facts and Figures, supra note 5, at 3 (providing hospice care involves
physicians, nurses, therapists, hospice aides, spiritual and bereavement counselors, social workers, and
the patient’s family).
8. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, §122, 96 Stat. 324,
356-64 (1982) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 400, 405, 408, 409, 418, 420, 421, and 489).
9. See 42 U.S.C. §1395f (Conditions of and limitations on payment for services) and 42 C.F.R.
§§418.20-418.22.
10. See 42 U.S.C. §1395d(d)(1).
11. Medicare Program, 79 Fed. Reg. 50452, 50454 (Vol. 79, No. 163, Part III, August 22, 2014)
(to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 405 and 418).
12. Id.
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“terminally ill,”13 defined by the statute as a medical prognosis of life
expectancy of six months or less.14 This certification must be based on a
physician’s or medical director’s “clinical judgment of the normal course
of the individual’s illness” and must satisfy two requirements,15
including: (1) the “certification must specify that the individual's
prognosis is for a life expectancy of [six] months or less if the terminal
illness runs its normal course;”16 and (2) “[c]linical information and other
documentation that support the medical prognosis must accompany the
certification and must be filed in the medical record.” 17 Additionally, the
certification must include a “brief narrative explanation of the clinical
findings that supports a life expectancy of [six] months or less as part of
the certification and recertification forms.”18 This certification must occur
within two days of initiating care or the physician cannot be repaid.19
To submit payment, MHB requires both an individual’s attending
physician and either the medical director or physician member of the
interdisciplinary group20 to certify in writing at the beginning of the initial
ninety-day treatment period that, based on clinical judgments, the
individual is terminally ill.21 Although there is no statutory limit to the
number of periods through which a patient may be certified,22 to receive
payment for each successive period, the physician or medical director
must recertify “at the beginning of the [ninety- or sixty-day] period that
the individual is terminally ill based on such clinical judgment.” 23 While
CMS acknowledges that prognostication is “not an exact science,” it
requires the prognosis and certification to be rooted in clinical
observations.24 CMS requires that clinical judgments “be supported by
13. 42 C.F.R. §418.20(b) (current through the September 14, 2020 issue of the Federal Register
with the exception of the amendments appearing at 85 Fed. Reg. 56686).
14. 42 U.S.C. §1395x(dd)(3)(A).
15. 42 C.F.R. §418.22(b) (current through the September 14, 2020 issue of the Federal Register
with the exception of the amendments appearing at 85 Fed. Reg. 56686).
16. Id. §418.22(b)(1).
17. Id. §418.22(b)(2).
18. Id. §418.22(b)(3).
19. Medicare Program; Hospice Care, 48 Fed. Reg. 56,008, Cmt. D: Certification of Terminal
Illness, but subject to exceptions under 42 C.F.R. §418.22(a)(3).
20. 42 U.S.C. §1395x(dd)(2)(B) (“has an interdisciplinary group of personnel which (i) includes
at least (I) one physician (as defined in subsection (r)(1)), (II) one registered professional nurse, and (III)
one social worker,
employed by or, in the case of a physician described in subclause (I), under contract with the agency or
organization, and also includes at least one pastoral or other counselor.”).
21. Id. §1395f(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)-(II); See also 42 C.F.R. §418.22(c)(1) (stating that for the first
ninety-day treatment period, the hospice must obtain written certification from both the medical director
and the individual’s attending physicians, if the individual has an attending physician).
22. 42 U.S.C. §1395d(d)(1).
23. Id. §1395f(a)(7)(A)(ii).
24. See supra text accompanying note 11.
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clinical information and other documentation that provide a basis for the
[hospice] certification.”25
B. The False Claims Act
Given the complex statutory requirements for MHB eligibility,
certification requires several pairs of reviewing eyes. Noncompliance
with certification, however, is possible. When the hospice provider falsely
asserts compliance with the statutory and regulatory requirement for
certification, the federal government or a private citizen, called a
“relator,” can bring a civil action pursuant to the FCA under a “false
certification” theory of liability.26
The FCA allows the federal government and relators to impose civil
liability on individuals who made false claims to the United States for
payment of services rendered.27 The FCA provides that any person who
“knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim
for payment or approval” or “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be
made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent
claim” is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty and
treble damages.28
When relators bring a qui tam action, the government can intervene.29
Should the government fail to intervene, the relators can continue the
action, but the court may allow the government to intervene at a later date
for good cause.30
Although the FCA has explicit definitions for what constitutes
“knowingly” making a false claim or statement,31 there is no definition
for “false.” Courts therefore look to the common law to define “false”
claims or statements.32 However, because medical professionals conduct
25. See supra text accompanying note 11.
26. See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S.Ct. 1989, 1999 (2016)
(providing that when a party makes a representation for reimbursement, but omits certain statutory or
regulatory requirements, those omissions can be a basis for False Claims Act liability). The Attorney
General brings the FCA action for the federal government. 31 U.S.C. §3730(a). Private citizens, called
relators, bring a qui tam action. 31 U.S.C. §3730(b)(1). Qui tam is defined as “an action brought under a
statute that allows a private person to sue for a penalty, part of which the government or some specified
public institution will receive.” Qui Tam Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th pocket ed. 1996).
27. 31 U.S.C. §§3729-33 (2020).
28. 31 U.S.C. §3729(a)(1)(A)-(B) (2020).
29. Id. §3730(b)(2).
30. Id. §3730(c)(3). Should the government fail to intervene, the relator can continue the suit on
the government’s behalf and is entitled to a percentage of the proceeds of the action or settlement. Id. at
§3730(d). The FCA also protects the relator against retaliation by rewarding all relief necessary to make
the relator whole. Id. at §3730(h)(1).
31. See id. §3729(b)(1) (providing the statute’s definition of “knowingly”).
32. See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S.Ct. 1989, 1999-2000
(2016) (holding courts have looked to common law to fill definitional gaps, and without indication
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the certifications, lower courts have adopted an “objective falsity”
standard for FCA challenges to allegedly unlawful hospice certification
and repayment.33
C. Lower Court Decisions
In United States ex rel. Geschrey v. Generations Healthcare, LLC., the
Northern District of Illinois held that to assert false claims, relators must
allege facts that “[demonstrate] that the certifying physician did not or
could not have believed, based on his or her clinical judgment, that the
patient was eligible for hospice care.34 The relators alleged the hospice
provider recruited and later certified several patients ineligible for
certification because those certifications occurred with only a review of
patients’ records and no physical patient interaction.35 The relators argued
these certifications were false because had patients been examined by
physicians, the physicians should have realized these patients were not
terminally ill.36 Nevertheless, the court dismissed the relators’ claim,37
reasoning that to survive a Rule 9(b) motion, certifying physicians only
need to confirm that their basis for certification was their review of the
record.38
In United States v. AseraCare Inc. (“AseraCare I”), the Northern
District of Alabama ruled that, to survive a motion for summary
judgment, the relator must prove objective falsehood, and that a mere
difference of opinion without more is not enough to show falsity.39 The
government, and relators, alleged AseraCare submitted false claims to
Medicare for certified patients who were not terminally ill as defined by
the statute.40 The government offered a single medical expert’s testimony

otherwise, Congress intends to incorporate the well-settled, common-law meanings).
33. See infra note 78.
34. 922 F. Supp. 2d 695, 703 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
35. Id. at 700. Relators allege that they would visit patients and prepare certifications to be signed
off by the medical director, who never visited the patients him/herself and conclude their own medical
judgment.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 703 (dismissing relators claims at pleading stage because 42 C.F.R.
§418.22(b)(3)(iii) was improperly interpreted).
38. Id. However, the court did let one claim proceed because relators did not merely claim a
difference of opinion but plead with particularity the hospice provider’s misrepresentation. Id. at 704.
39. 153 F. Supp. 3d 1372, 1381 (N.D. Ala. 2015) (“AseraCare I”). To reach this conclusion, the
court relied on United States ex rel. Parato v. Unadilla Health Care Ctr. Inc., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1339
(M.D. Ga. 2011) for the “proof of objective falsehood” component and United States ex rel. Phalp v.
Lincare Holdings, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 3d 1326, 1360 (S.D. Fla. 2015) for the “mere difference of opinion”
component because that court held “[e]xpressions of opinion, scientific judgments, or statements as to
conclusions about which reasonable minds may differ cannot be false.”
40. AseraCare I, 153 F. Supp. at 1375.
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to prove the certifications were false.41 That expert testified that over 100
AseraCare patients were erroneously certified as terminally ill based on
his clinical review of 233 records.42
The jury instructions were crucial to the court’s ultimate decision. They
explained that “a claim is ‘false’ if it is an assertion that is untrue when
made or when used” and “practices that may be improper, standing alone,
are insufficient to show falsity without proof that specific claims were in
fact false when submitted to Medicare.”43 After a verdict for the relators,44
the court granted a motion for a new trial and ruled that the relators needed
to demonstrate proof of an objective falsehood, and without more, a mere
difference of opinions regarding terminal illness status was insufficient to
prove falsity.45 Ultimately, the court resisted an approach that would
undermine the clinical judgment of the certifying physician.46
In United States ex rel. Wall v. Vista Hospice Care, Inc., the Northern
District of Texas relied on Aseracare II and applied the objective
falsehood standard.47 The court ruled that an expert’s subjective
41. Id.
42. See id. at 1375-76 (stating the government’s expert reviewed a total of 233 patient records
who receiving continuous care for over 365 days and determined that 123 patient certifications did not
support a prognosis of terminal illness).
43. Id. at 1382. Before the jury verdict, the court denied AseraCare’s motion for summary
judgment urging the court to adopt the falsity standard articulated in Geshrey. The court denied the motion
because the standard focused too much on certifying physicians’ beliefs, and the court believed the
government should be able to link witness testimony to show physicians lacked sufficient information to
make clinical judgments. The case was bifurcated to first determine the falsity element and then the
remaining FCA elements: knowledge, materiality, and government forfeiture. The bifurcated trial had
important implications for the Eleventh Circuit’s decision because at trial, the government could only rely
on some of the record to argue the falsity element. The district court did not allow the government to
present the entire record that was going to be used in the combined knowledge, materiality, and forfeiture
trial.
44. See AseraCare I.153 F. Supp. at 1379 (noting after the government’s case-in-chief, AseraCare
moved for judgment as a matter of law and renewed its motion at the close of evidence; however, the
court reserved ruling on the motions and submitted special interrogatories to the jury, who ruled in favor
for the government on 104 of the 123 patient records).
45. Id. at 1385. Additionally, the court granted summary judgment sua sponte because it
determined that even under the correct legal standard, the government would not have been able to prove
objective falsehood. The government only had presented testimony of an expert who reviewed old
certifications yet failed to prove that simply because reasonable minds may differ does not mean the initial
certification was false. Id. at 1387. Importantly, the court noted that the relator’s expert could look at the
patient records at two different occasions and come to different conclusions about the prognoses, yet not
be incorrect on either review, meant his “contradiction of the certifying physician’s clinical judgment
alone cannot constitute sufficient evidence of falsity.” U.S. v. AseraCare Inc. (“AseraCare II”), 176 F.
Supp. 3d 1282, 1285-86 (N.D. Ala. 2016) (granting new trial and summary judgment in Aseracare’s
favor), aff’d in part and remanded in part, 938 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2019).
46. See AseraCare II, 176 F. Supp. 3d at 1285 (granting summary judgment sua sponte for
AseraCare) The court refused to allow the government to retain an expert to present contradictory
testimony to prove falsity because it previously ruled that expressions of opinions that reasonable minds
can differ cannot be false.
47. No. 3:07-cv-00604-M, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80160, at *59-61 (N.D. Tex. June 20, 2016).
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testimony regarding certification, without more and in the absence of
objective falsehood, was insufficient to allege “falsity.”48 In this case, the
relator attempted to satisfy the burden of proof by presenting a single
medical expert’s testimony regarding proper certifications.49 The court
explained that the expert’s testimony that ninety-percent of the reviewed
records were ineligible for certification50 failed to present a triable issue
of fact.51 Nevertheless, the court noted that had the relators linked the
expert testimony to the corporate scheme to falsify records, there might
have been a triable issue on the “falsity” element.52
In Druding v. Care Alternatives, Inc., the District Court of New Jersey
relied on AseraCare I and Vista Hospice and held that relators must
present evidence of a claim’s objective falsehood, and that a mere
difference of opinions without more is not enough to show falsity.53 Here,
the relators alleged the defendant engaged in a concerted effort to recruit
patients and then fraudulently certify them as MHB-eligible.54 The
relators relied on examples of FCA violations as well as their expert’s
report.55 Their expert reviewed forty-seven patient records and opined
that twenty-six of those patients were eligible for their entire treatment
periods, while sixteen were only eligible for part of their respective
periods.56 Additionally, the expert opined that any reasonable physician
48. Id. at *59-61.
49. Id. at *31. First, relator had a statistician select 12,000 patients to be in the population, select
a stratified sample of 291 patients for the medical expert to evaluate, and then extrapolate the expert’s
evaluations to form an opinion of the 12,000 claims in the population that were false.
50. Id. at *33-34.
51. Id. at *59. The court ruled extrapolation cannot establish FCA liability because hospice
certification is a subjective process for each patient’s eligibility, which depends on the clinical judgment
of the certifying physician. Id. at *36. The court continued to explain that Medicare allows certifying
physicians to use subjective medical findings. As there are no objective standards for eligibility, the
contrary subjective opinion of the relator’s expert was insufficient to prove certifying physicians erred in
evaluating life expectancies and whether those physicians failed to exercise their clinical judgments during
those certifications. Id. at *58.
52. See id. at *60-62 (suggesting that relators link the scheme of false certifications to expert
testimony to prove falsity).
53. 346 F. Supp. 3d 669, 685 (D.N.J. 2018) ) (ruling mere difference of expert opinion on clinical
judgments is insufficient for falsity under the FCA), rev’d, 952 F.3d 89 (3rd Cir. 2019). The court relied
on the premise that medical opinions are subjective and cannot be false as Fifth Circuit similarly held in
United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 355 F.3d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding
“expressions of opinion or scientific judgments about which reasonable minds may differ cannot be
‘false’”). Id.
54. Id. at 672. After relators filed the lawsuit in April 2009, the government stayed the lawsuit for
further investigation, and after seven years, finally informed the court that it would not intervene in the
action. Id. at 676.
55. See id. at 677-79 (discussing relators’ testimony).
56. Id. at 681. Relators had the expert review the forty-seven records that were produced during
discovery. The expert explained the difficulty in prognostication, but he relied on guidelines from experts
at the National Hospice and Palliative Care Organization and other criteria utilized in the field to perform
his review. At the end of his review, 214 out of 603 periods (~35%) of the hospice certification periods
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would have reached the same conclusion.57 However, Care Alternatives’
own expert reviewed the relators’ expert’s findings and testified that,
based on his clinical judgment and analysis, a reasonable physician would
have certified each of the forty-seven patients.58 The court ruled that
diverging opinions do not create a genuine issue of material fact when
there is no factual evidence that certifying doctors knowingly made false
determinations.59
After the Druding opinion’s release in 2018, FCA claims for hospice
certification followed a well-reasoned rule of law. To survive a motion
for summary judgment, the relator must prove that the defendant engaged
in objective falsehoods when certifying patients, and a mere difference of
opinion among medical experts would not suffice to prove claims of
falsity.
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The Druding standard circulated in the lower courts until the Eleventh
and Third Circuits considered it, which resulted in the circuit split. This
Section examines the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in United States v.
AseraCare, Inc., which adopted the Druding standard. Next, this Section
explains how the Third Circuit rejected the Druding standard in United
States ex rel. Druding v. Druding and instead held that a difference of
opinion among medical experts is tantamount to a genuine issue of
material fact.60
A. AseraCare III
In AseraCare III, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the “objective
falsehood” standard but remanded the case with direction.61 In AseraCare
III, the court reasoned the government’s case was weakened because the
expert failed to affirmatively testify that, “in his opinion, no reasonable
lacked documentation supporting hospice care. He also found that some medical records were incomplete
for the certified patients.
57. Id. Although the expert opined that any reasonable physician would have reached the same
conclusion, the relators’ expert failed to show any falsity in the certifications.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 688.
60. 952 F.3d 89, 95 (3rd Cir. 2019) (holding differing medical expert testimony that opines patient
certifications did not support patients’ prognoses can be considered false creates a dispute of material
fact).
61. U.S. v. AseraCare, Inc. (“AseraCare III”), 938 F.3d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 2019) (ruling that
falsity under Medicare for FCA liability cannot be proved when there is only a reasonable disagreement
between medical experts and no other evidence to prove falsity). The Eleventh Circuit remanded the case
because the government should have been able to rely on the entire record and not merely what was argued
during the falsity element of the bifurcated trial.
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doctor could have concluded that the identified patients were terminally
ill at the time of certification.”62 Instead of affirmatively testifying that no
doctor would have given a prognosis of terminally ill, the expert relied
solely on his clinical judgment and a review of patient records, which
conflicted with those of AseraCare’s expert.63 In addition, the court
considered how the experts reached their conclusions. The government’s
expert used a ‘checkbox approach’ by relying on his clinical judgments
and medical guidelines for MHB eligibility, whereas AseraCare’s expert
took a more holistic approach to certifying patients.64 Although the
experts agreed on the underlying diagnoses, they diverged regarding their
conclusions for the patients’ eligibilities.65 The court reasoned that the
experts’ conflicting testimonies and the lower court’s insufficient jury
instruction forced the jury to decide which expert was “more persuasive,
with the less persuasive opinion being deemed to be false.”66
Next, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized that the term “clinical
judgment” permeates the statutory and regulatory requirements for
certification.67 The court therefore found that hospice certification must
be based on the certifying physician’s clinical judgment regarding a
holistic patient medical record.68 The court noted that the regulations do
not require clinical judgments to prove terminal illness as a matter of
medical fact or that patients’ records demonstrate to a reviewing and
unaffiliated physician that the patients were terminally ill upon
certification.69 Rather, the regulations merely state that “clinical
information and other [supporting documentation for certification] . . .
62. Id. at 1287.
63. Id. at 1284-85, 1287. The government’s expert testified that 123 of the 233 records he
reviewed did not satisfy hospice eligibility requirements.
64. See id. at 1288 (articulating the fundamental difference in how experts should analyze patients
for eligibility).
65. See id. at 1289 (providing an illustration of how the experts starkly disagreed with patient
eligibly even though they agreed on the patient’s diagnoses).
66. Id. at 1288-89. As a case of first impression, the Eleventh Circuit had to resolve eligibility
issues when the “certifying physician exercised genuine clinical judgment [to determine] a patient’s
prognosis” and if the accuracy of that judgment was “susceptible to being proven as true or false as a
factual matter.” See id. at 1291-92 (conceding no other circuit had considered falsity for a MHB violation
and summarizing the issue for review).
67. See id. at 1292-93 (emphasizing that 42 U.S.C. §1395f(a)(7)(A) requires that for the initial
90-day hospice period, signatures of both the individual’s physician and the medical director each certify
eligibility based on their clinical judgements, and that for subsequent hospice periods, recertification
requires clinical judgment. Also, 42 C.F.R. §418.22(b) states terminal illness is determined by the
certifying physician’s clinical judgement).
68. See AseraCare III, 938 F.3d at 1293 (noting that given the requirements of 42 C.F.R.
§418.22(b)(2)-(3) and the 79 Fed. Reg. 50452, 50471 (Aug. 22, 2014), clinical judgments lie at the center
for certification and patient records help physicians make informed decisions regarding certification).
69. See id. at 1293-94 (noting the absence of language in the statute and regulations to require that
clinical judgments prove terminal illness as a matter of medical fact and patient records to prove to any
reviewing expert that the patient was objectively terminally ill when she was certified by the physician).
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accompany the certification” and “be filed in medical record.”70 So,
clinical judgments regarding eligibility only require a “reasonable
interpretation of those relevant medical records.”71 The court further
noted that because prognostication is not an exact science, Congress
granted deference to certifying physicians to make clinical judgments
regarding certification72 but still required physicians to rely on subjective
and objective medical findings of patients’ conditions before arriving at
clinical judgments.73
Recognizing that reasonable doctors may disagree regarding a patient’s
condition, the court ruled that two physicians exercising their clinical
judgment of a patient’s prognosis could disagree without either of them
being incorrect.74 As long as the underlying clinical judgment did not
reflect objective falsehood, there could be no FCA liability.75
The court then provided three examples that would satisfy objective
falsehood: (1) the certifying physician held an ill-informed clinical
judgment by failing to familiarize herself with the patient’s records before
certification; (2) the certifying physician did not subjectively believe the
patient was terminally ill; or (3) expert evidence proves that no reasonable
physician could conclude that the patient was terminally ill given the
medical records.76 In sum, if relators only present evidence of differing
expert opinions regarding certification, without providing evidence of
objective falsehoods, the claim fails as a matter of law and granting
summary judgment is proper.77
70. See id. at 1294 (quoting 42 C.F.R. §418.22(b)(2)).
71. Id. at 1294. The court also noted that CMS did not use the word “objective” to demonstrate
terminally illness in patients’ medical records; CMS only used “support[ing]”. Id.
72. See id. at 1295 (according to 79 Fed. Reg. 50452, 50470, CMS knows “predicting life
expectancy is not an exact science,” and thus well-founded clinical judgments should be granted
deference). Later in its opinion, the court also notes that “’terminally ill’ presents, by design, a question
of debatable clinical judgement that may not, in all circumstances, lend itself to just one determination as
to the proper exercise of that judgment.” Id. at 1299.
73. See id. at 1295 (relying on 42 C.F.R. §418.102(b), the court ruled clinical judgments cannot
disregard patient’s underlying medical conditions; they must consider factors like “subjective and
objective medical findings”).
74. See id. at 1296 (accepting the district’s court post-verdict conclusion that physicians could
disagree on projected life expectancy, and thus eligibility, but neither physician be wrong). Here the court
mentions that the government’s own witness, a former head of the company who processes claims for
MHB reimbursement, testified that “two doctors using their clinical judgment could come to different
conclusions about a patient’s prognosis and neither be right or wrong.” Id.
75. See id. at 1297 (relying on CMS commentary, the court stated the legal framework for MHB
did not require exact certitude for prognostication but only required that certifying physicians exercise
their best judgment for eligibility when considering all the relevant medical records).
76. See id. (providing various methods to prove objective falsehood for eligibility).
77. See id. at 1297 (holding that without evidence of objective falsehood, FCA claims fail as a
matter of law). The court relied on several circuit court decisions where FCA liability could only be
asserted by plaintiffs proving objective falsity. See e.g., United States ex rel. Yannacopoulos v. General
Dynamics, 652 F.3d 818, 836 (7th Cir. 2011); United States ex rel. Loughren v. Unum Grp., 613 F.3d
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AseraCare III requires that relators produce evidence of objective
falsehood to survive a motion for summary judgment. An array of
opposing experts does not prove false certifications because reasonable
minds can differ on clinical judgments, and Congress has granted
deference to certifying physicians when determining whether a patient
has a terminal illness.
B. United States ex rel. Druding v. Druding
In contrast, the Third Circuit held that differing expert testimony
creates a triable issue of material fact under the MHB. 78 The court ruled
expert testimony can establish FCA falsehood when the testimony opines
that patient records do not support a prognosis of terminal illness.79
Rejecting the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis, the Third Circuit held differing
clinical judgments can prove falsity, thereby establishing FCA liability
and the chance to survive a motion for summary judgement.80
First, the court noted that Congress did not define the terms false or
fraudulent under the FCA, and therefore courts have looked to the
common law for guidance.81 The court reasoned that because other courts
have held expert opinions can be false, the subjective nature of opinions
in conjunction with contradictory medical expert opinions can show
falsity under the FCA.82 Moreover, the court criticized conflating the
scienter and falsity elements into the “objective falsity” standard to
300, 310 (1st Cir. 2010); United States ex rel. Wilson v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 525 F.3d 370, 37677 (4th Cir. 2008); United States ex rel. Burlbaw v. Orenduff, 548 F.3d 931, 959 (10th Cir. 2008); Harrison
v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 792 (4th Cir. 1999); Hooper v. Lockheed Martin
Corp., 688 F.3d 1037, 1047-49 (9th Cir. 2012); Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus.
Pension Fund, 575 U.S. 175, 186 (2015). Aseracare III, 938 F.3d 1297 at n. 10.
78. See United States ex rel. Druding v. Druding (“Druding II”), 952 F.3d 89, 91 (3rd Cir. 2019)
(holding that plaintiffs who bring an FCA lawsuit do not need to prove objective falsehood to survive a
motion for summary judgment because differing expert opinions regarding MHB eligibility do create a
genuine dispute of material fact as to falsity.
79. See id. at 95 (holding contradictory expert testimony regarding patient MHB eligibility can be
considered false under the FCA and establish a triable issue of liability).
80. See id. (ruling the district court erred when it relied on the N.D. Ala. and N.D. of Tex. cases
which adopted the “objective falsehood” standard) (emphasis added).
81. See id. (relying on Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S.Ct.
1989, 1999-2000 (2016), courts have looked to common law to fill definitional gaps, and without
indication otherwise, Congress intends to incorporate the well-settled, common-law meanings).
82. The court relied on several cases where opinions are considered “false” for purposes of
liability under common law. See e.g. Omnicare, 575 U.S. at 183-85 (2015) (finding opinions may be false
statements in determining liability under the securities law); Hersckowitz v. Nutri/Sys., Inc., 857 F.2d
179, 184 (3rd Cir. 2015) (finding “an opinion . . . will be deemed untrue for purposes of the federal
securities laws if it is issued without reasonable genuine belief or if it has no basis”); See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§525 cmt. c, 539 cmt. a (Am. L. Inst. 1977) (“instructing that an
opinion may be false when the speaker makes an express statement contrary to the opinion he or she
actually holds”). See Druding II, 952 F.3d at 95-96.
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determine FCA liability.83 The court noted that scienter limits hospice
providers’ exposure to FCA liability when the government or relator can
find any expert who disagrees with the certifying physician.84 Thus,
conflating the two requirements is “inconsistent with the text and
application of the statute.”85
Second, the Third Circuit rejected the lower court’s ruling that falsity
could only be established if experts’ judgments were factually incorrect—
not just legally false because of expert disagreements regarding
certification.86 The court explained that a theory of legal falsity is
sufficient for establishing FCA liability when claims submitted for
reimbursement are not reimbursable because they fail to meet regulatory
requirements.87
Because experts could disagree on a patient’s prognosis and eligibility,
these disagreements can be evidence that a certification is non-compliant
with regulations and therefore legally false.88 Accordingly, different
expert opinions create a genuine issue of material fact that is triable.89
Moreover, because the court established that subjective medical opinions
can be false for purposes of the FCA, and are therefore not immune to
scrutiny, 90 the court held that differing opinions can create triable issues
regarding FCA falsity.91
As mentioned, the Third Circuit criticized other courts for adopting the
“objective falsehood” standard and mistakenly conflating falsity and
scienter when ruling on motions for summary judgment.92 The court
83. See id., 952 F.3d at 96 (noting that the FCA denotes falsity and scienter elements
independently for a proving liability under 31 U.S.C. §3729(a)(1)(A)).
84. See id. (relying on United States ex rel. Polukoff v. St. Mark’s Hosp., 895 F.3d 730, 734 (10th
Cir. 2018) (noting scienter requirements can be used to address excessive liability concerns).
85. Id.
86. See id. at 97 (rejecting the rigid position that clinical judgments are subjective in nature, and
thus, different opinions cannot be false).
87. See id. (relying on United States ex rel. Walker v. R&F Props. Of Lake Cty., Inc., 433 F.3d
1349, 1356 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding “[m]edicare claims may be false if they claim reimbursement for
services or costs that either are not reimbursable or were not rendered as claimed”).
88. See id. (reasoning that certification requirements under 42 C.F.R. §§418.20 and §418.22(b)(2)
articulate strict regulatory guidelines, and the fact that experts could look at the same medical records and
come to different clinical judgments on a patient’s prognosis meant there was evidence that hospice
providers failed to meet regulatory guidelines for certification and thus reimbursement for treatment).
89. See id. at 98 (stating expert opinions can be false at times and the reliability and believability
of expert testimony should be left to the jury to establish a FCA liability under the legally false theory).
The court continued to say that subjective medical opinions can be considered false and medical opinions
are not shielded for judicial scrutiny.
90. See id. at 100 (relying on United States v. Paulus, 894 F.3d 267, 276-77 (6th Cir. 2018)
(providing that the common law definition of fraud permits that medical opinions may be considered false
and are not shield from judicial scrutiny).
91. Id.
92. See id. at 100-01 (reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Care
Alternatives and specifying that Third Circuit courts must analyze “falsity” and “scienter” elements
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therefore decided that differing medical expert opinions regarding
certification should be sent to the jury to determine whether they were
indeed false.
IV. DISCUSSION
Although the Eleventh Circuit’s proof of objective falsehood
requirement was appropriate, a better way to assess expert review of
recertifications would be to determine whether the initial certification was
“reasonable and necessary for the . . . management of terminal illness.”93
Part A of this Section argues that the Eleventh Circuit adopted the correct
legal standard. Part B of this Section argues that the Third Circuit’s
holding was misplaced because it requires more than what is written in
the regulations. Part C of this Section argues that the Eleventh Circuit
should have scrutinized the expert’s review of the certifications against
the reasonable and necessary provision for treating terminally ill patients.
Under that standard, the Eleventh Circuit could have found examples of
objective falsehoods. Part D of this Section emphasizes the importance of
the 2011 changes for hospice certification and suggests that if the changes
were enacted before the relators brought suit against AseraCare, they
could have been successful in their claim. Finally, Part E of this Section
argues that the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis provides some immunity for
hospice providers against future FCA liability and discusses potential
policy and legal implications of the decision.
A. The Eleventh Circuit Adopted the Correct Legal Standard
The Eleventh Circuit was correct in deciding that, to survive a motion
for summary judgment on the element of falsity, relators must prove
objective falsehood.94 As the court noted, the FCA’s statutory language
and regulatory framework both support an “objective falsehood”
standard.95 Because nothing in the language or framework requires
certifying physicians to be certain that patients would die at the end of six
months,96 CMS gave physicians deference regarding patient
certifications. The law only requires that physicians look to the
accompanying clinical information and other documents in patients’
medical records to make certification decisions.97 Because the physicians
independently when adjudicating FCA lawsuits).
93. 42 U.S.C. §1395y(a)(1)(C).
94. See supra text accompanying note 78.
95. AseraCare III, 938 F.3d at 1298.
96. Id. 1296.
97. See 42 C.F.R. §418.22(b)(2) requiring that clinical information and other documentation
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in AseraCare III exercised their clinical judgment and relied on the
patients’ medical records, the physicians complied with the legal
requirements and properly certified patients.98
Congress did not require physicians’ clinical judgments to be
incontrovertible when making their certifications, and thus, physicians
could not have falsified any records when they demonstrably satisfied the
legal requirements.99 The law does not require anything more for hospice
providers. Unless relators can present more than conflicting expert
testimony, there are no factual issues for juries to resolve.100 Allowing the
jury to assess differing expert opinions contradicts the wide latitude
Congress granted physicians to exercise their clinical judgments to make
an informed decision without fear of future liability.101 Regardless, the
split between the Third Circuit’s and Eleventh Circuit’s interpretations of
falsity under the FCA unnecessarily complicated FCA hospice
jurisprudence.102
B. Critique of Third Circuit’s Ruling
The Third Circuit wrongly held that differing expert opinions are proof
of a genuine issue of material fact.103 Despite the Third Circuit’s statement
that courts must interpret statutes to determine violations, the court read
words into the statutory text.104 To certify patients for hospice care,
Congress only required that clinical judgments comply with regulations.
If Congress wanted more criteria, then it is up to Congress to make those
determinations.105 The mere difference of opinions regarding certification
does not make the certifications false—and thus triable—because
Congress has not written that into the statute. Furthermore, a litany of
FCA lawsuits have previously held “[e]xpressions of opinion, scientific

support the medical prognosis.
98. See AseraCare III, 938 F.3d at 1296.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 1297 (providing that failure to identify facts and circumstances surrounding patient
certification that show inconsistencies with proper clinical judgment fail as a matter of law).
101. See AseraCare III, 938 F.3d at 1295.
102. Patrick M. Hagan, Two Circuits Hold the FCA Does Not Require “Objective Falsity,”
Creating Confusion on the Appropriate Standard, 6 PRATT'S GOV’T CONTRACTING L. REP. §63.04 (2020)
(stating the Third Circuit’s rejection of AseraCare III creates unnecessary confusion).
103. Id. (arguing the Third Circuit improperly immunized that all medical opinions from liability
and thus botched its analysis of the falsity element and confused the rule of law that is likely similar to
the Eleventh Circuit’s holding).
104. See Druding II, 952 F.3d at 95 (providing that questions of statutory interpretation begin with
an analysis of the text) (citing Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1999).
105. See AseraCare III, 938 F.3d at 1301 (stating that Congress determines eligibility requirements
for certification, and until Congress changes how a physician’s clinical judgment governs certification,
that clinical judgment is granted deference when making prognoses that lead to certification).
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judgments, or statements as to conclusions about which reasonable minds
may differ cannot be false.”106
The Third Circuit held that FCA liability can arise under the implied
false certification theory.107 While both circuits agree that implied false
certification leads to liability, the Third Circuit did not discuss how Care
Alternative providers failed to follow the statutory and regulatory
framework for certification. When the government’s expert reviewed the
records, he opined that his prognoses would not have resulted in
certification.108 That difference of opinion is presumably proof of a
genuine dispute of material fact. That expert, however, could not further
testify that Care Alternative’s certifications violated the legal
frameworks—crucial to the legally false analysis for compliance with
regulations.109 The government’s expert could not testify to that point
because the patient records he reviewed included the requisite clinical
information and supporting documentation.110 Had those records lacked
the necessary supporting documents, then Care Alternatives would have
violated the law, because it falsely certified patients. 111 In that scenario,
those violations would have been elicited by differing experts opining that
106. United States ex rel. Roby v. Boeing Co., 100 F. Supp. 2d 619, 625 (S.D. Ohio 2000)
(ultimately denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment because plaintiff’s presented evidence of
objective falsehood that defendant supplied United States Army with defective helicopter transmission
gears). See also United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 355 F.3d 370, 376 (5th Cir.
2004) (holding “expressions of opinion or scientific judgments about which reasonable minds may differ
cannot be ‘false’”); United States ex rel. Morton v. A Plus Benefits, Inc., 139 Fed. Appx. 980, 983-84
(10th Cir. 2005) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss because expression of opinions regarding an
ambiguous term regarding insurance coverage under ERISA did not sufficiently allege FCA liability);
United States ex rel. Hill v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry, 448 Fed. Appx. 314, 316 (3rd Cir. 2011) (affirming
the district court’s granting of defendant’s motion for summary judgment after three independent review
panels confirmed that there was no scientific misconduct and thus relators failed to prove objective
falsehood); United States ex rel. Jones v. Brigham & Women's Hosp., 678 F.3d 72, 87, 90 (1st Cir. 2012)
(agreeing that scientific judgments which reasonable minds can differ cannot be false, but vacating the
grant of summary judgment because the facts did not amount to scientific judgments); U.S. v. Prabhu,
442 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1036, n. 23 (D. Nev. 2019) (granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment
because relator failed to show falsity regarding tests that were reasonable and necessary).
107. See Druding II, 952 F.3d at 97 (stating the Third Circuit recognizes both factual falsity and
legal falsity for FCA liability).
108. Id. at 94.
109. See id. (leaving room for this omission of the expert’s testimony, which was pivotal the Third
Circuit’s legally false analysis).
110. See id. (providing the records satisfied §418.22(b)(2) requirements).
111. That did not happen in this case. Even if the district court did limit its analysis to factual
falsity, upon appellate review, it should have been clear that the district court’s analysis was in fact limited
to legal falsity. See Druding II, 952 F.3d at 97 (stating the district court limited its FCA falsity analysis to
factual falsity). This was because the government argued that by having an expert find the certifications
to be improper, Care Alternatives must not have complied with the regulations. See Druding, 346 F. Supp.
3d at 681 (describing the government’s expert’s testimony). Nowhere did the government argue that Care
Alternatives falsified those patient records before Care Alternative physicians certified patients. See id. at
680-81 (providing evidence that relators alleged altered patient records so that patients could be certified
but failing to link those allegedly altered records to those records reviewed by the government’s expert).
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there was insufficient information in the patient record to warrant
certification, which would have presented a triable issue.
Furthermore, the Third Circuit inappropriately relied on Sixth Circuit
precedent to determine that clinical judgments are not immune from
judicial scrutiny.112 Citing United States v. Paulus, the Third Circuit
adopted that “medical ‘opinions are not, and have never been, completely
insulated from scrutiny,’” and that “‘reliability and believability of
[differing] expert testimony . . . is exclusively for the jury to decide.’”113
However, Paulus involved criminal liability for healthcare fraud.114 The
Third Circuit also ignored the Paulus court’s reasoning “that opinions
may trigger liability for fraud when they are not honestly held by their
maker or when the speaker knows of facts that are fundamentally
incompatible with his opinion.”115 Instead of limiting that language to
allege liability, the Third Circuit used that language to support the
position that differing medical opinions raise genuine disputes of material
fact.116 Finally, the Third Circuit failed to note that Dr. Paulus’s
conviction was based on his misrepresentation of facts rather than
opinions.117
The Third Circuit’s failure to acknowledge these considerations
weaken their ruling for two reasons. First, the court ignored important
language regarding the scienter element of an FCA claim. The Sixth
Circuit arguably combined the falsity and scienter elements, which the
Third Circuit explicitly held was improper because the elements are
distinct.118 Second, because the Sixth Circuit reinstated the conviction
due to misrepresentation of facts rather than a difference of opinions, the
Third Circuit selected favorable parts of the Sixth Circuit’s holding. Had
112. See Druding II, 952 F.3d at 98 (relying on United States v. Paulus, 894 F.3d 267 (6th Cir.
2018)).
113. See id. (quoting Paulus, 894 F.3d at 275, 277).
114. See Paulus, 894 F.3d at 270 (reversing the district court’s judgment of acquittal after
defendant Paulus was convicted of healthcare fraud).
115. Id. at 275 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §539(1)(a) (Am. L. Inst. 1977).
116. See Druding II, 952 F.3d at 98. See also Winter ex rel. United States v. Gardens Reg’l Hosp.
& Med. Ctr., Inc., 953 F.3d 1108, 1118 (9th Cir. 2020) (noting false certification of medical necessity can
give rise to FCA liability). In Winter, the court held that any patient certification for medically necessity
can be false for the same reasons as any opinion can be false, but the FCA does not require a plaintiff to
plead an “objective falsehood.” Id. at 1119. The “objective falsehood” standard was adopted by lower
courts and the Eleventh Circuit because after extensive discovery, the relators needed to present more
evidence than what was pleaded to proceed to trial.
117. Druding II, 952 F.3d at 98. The court failed to provide that crucial detail in its analysis, and
by doing so conflated that the expert testimony going to trial in Paulus was in fact expert opinion
testimony reviewing medical records, when it was actually expert opinion testimony regarding verifiable
facts.
118. See id. at 100 (stating scienter and falsity are separate elements of an FCA claim). See also
Hagan, supra note 103(arguing that by using Paulus and Omnicare as authority, the Third Circuit
contradicts itself because both of those cases conflate falsity and scienter elements).
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the Third Circuit reasoned that the government’s expert opinion differed
from Care Alternative’s expert opinion because of the misrepresentation
of facts in the patient records, then the two differing testimonies would
present a genuine dispute of material fact.
While the Third Circuit’s ruling appeared to be an anomaly in FCA
claims,119 the court’s belief that medical opinions should not be entirely
insulted from judicial scrutiny is persuasive. If we accept that medical
opinions can never be scrutinized, maybe individuals who argue hospice
certifications that result in unreasonable and unnecessary care for the
management of terminal illness can be used to help prove the initial
certifications were indeed false.120
C. Certifications that Result in Reasonable and Necessary Care
The Eleventh Circuit should have considered how the certifications at
issue conformed to the reasonable and necessary regulation. To begin, the
government’s expert reviewed 233 records, but the Eleventh Circuit failed
to acknowledge the factual importance of those records.121 All of the
certification records were for patients receiving hospice care for over a
year.122 The Eleventh Circuit should have required AseraCare to justify
those certifications because the patients twice outlived the regulatory
expectation of terminally ill individuals.123
While prognostication is not an exact science,124 repeated
recertification of hospice status should raise questions. Patients in hospice
care for over 365 continuous days require a minimum of five
recertifications.125 That number should raise questions about the
correctness of the initial certification, especially because the median
length of hospice care ranged from seventeen to eighteen days from 2000
119. See supra text accompanying note 78. But see Hagan, supra note 103 (arguing that the
muddled Druding II ruling actually requires the same standard as AseraCare III to prove falsity—relator’s
expert to opine that no reasonable physician could have reached the conclusion at issue).
120. 42 U.S.C. §1395y(a)(1)(C).
121. See AseraCare III, 938 F.3d at 1284, 1304 (providing that the district court acknowledged the
233 certifications were for patients receiving treatment for over 365 continuous days, and the Eleventh
Circuit stating that the expert’s testimony might still not be enough to show falsity because the expert
could not link those records to the specific instances of questionable certifications provided by each
relator’s testimony).
122. Id. at 1284.
123. See 42 U.S.C. §1395x(dd)(3)(A) (“individual is considered to be ‘terminally ill’ if the
individual has a medical prognosis that the individual’s life expectancy is 6 months or less”).
124. See supra text accompanying note 11.
125. See 42 U.S.C. §1395f(a)(7)(A) (stating that for the first 90-day period, a physician or medical
director certify patient as terminally ill, and for the subsequent 90-, and each subsequent 60-day, period
the medical professional recertify at the beginning of the treatment period that the patient is terminally ill
based on clinical judgments). The patients were certified five times because 365 days equates to two, 90day periods and three, 60-day periods.
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to 2010.126
According to regulations, the initial certification requires a prognosis
of terminal illness based on a medical expert’s clinical judgment and
supporting documents.127 Yet, if the patient is on his fifth recertification,
does that mean the first clinical judgment, made 300 days ago, was
misguided, arbitrary, unreasonable or unnecessary?128 If true, the initial
certification is potentially proof of an objective falsehood.129
Furthermore, if the first certifying physician was the same physician
recertifying the patient for the fifth time, then relators could allege that
the physician could not hold a subjective belief the patient was terminally
ill for the first certification.130 The argument being, that by certifying the
patient on day 300, the physician believed that she initially certified a
patient when no other reasonable physician would have made that same
initial certification.131
To recertify a patient who no other reasonable physician would have
recertified is exactly what the Eleventh Circuit described as proof of
objective falsehood.132 If an expert had testified to that fact, AseraCare’s
motion for summary judgment may have been denied. Moreover, the
ability for an expert to provide such testimony becomes more plausible
when viewed against the total number of patients from which the sample
was taken. In AseraCare III, 2,180 individuals received continuous care
for over 365 days. Only 233 patient certifications, however, were subject

126. David G. Stevenson, Ph.D., Growing Pains for the Medicare Hospice Benefit, 367: 18 N.
ENGL. J. MED. 1683, 1684 (Nov. 1, 2012) (the author importantly notes that this figure represents a sizable
minority of beneficiaries who enroll only days before death). Additionally, in the government’s complaint
filed in 2012, it was alleged that from at least 2007, AseraCare submitted false claims for Medicare
reimbursement. See Intervenor Complaint at ¶35, United States v. AseraCare, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 3d 1372
(N.D. Ala. 2015) (Case No. 2:12-cv-0245-KOB).
127. See 42 C.F.R. §418.22(b)(2) (“Clinical information and other documentation that support the
medical prognosis must accompany the certification and must be filed in the medical record”).
128. Stevenson, supra note 127, at 1684 (stating “defining hospice eligibility relative to the 6month prognosis mark is clinically arbitrary and practically difficult, especially for people with noncancer
diagnoses”).
129. The objective falsehood would be that the physician did not subjectively believe the patient
was terminally ill.
130. The author writes this sentence because the subjective belief of the certifying physician that
the patient was not terminally ill is an example of how to prove “objective falsehood” according to the
Eleventh Circuit.
131. For some MHB figures see MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY, 355, at Figure 6.1 (March 2009) [hereinafter MedPAC March
2009 report] (providing that from 2000 to 2005, the median length of hospice stay was just over two weeks
but stays for patients in the 90th Percentile rose from approximately 140 days to approximately 215 days).
It would appear that even on day 300, the physician would arguably be recertifying a patient who would
fall in the 99th Percentile. See also Amanda Jacobowski, Calculating Death: Implications of the SixMonth Prognosis Certification Requirement for the Medicare Hospice Benefit, 19 ELDER L. J. 187, 203
(2011) (finding that in 2008, the average length of a hospice stay was 69 days).
132. See supra text accompanying note 77.
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to expert testimony.133 Although the size of the patient pool provides no
concrete indication that any single certification was legally false, it is
arguable that relators could have retained several experts to testify that
hundreds of those 2,180 initial certifications were false and required
unreasonable and unnecessary treatment.134
If the above argument had been accepted, then the Eleventh Circuit
would have concluded that the initial payment for hospice services during
the first 90-day period was neither reasonable nor necessary for the
management of terminal illness.135 This presents a clear example of legal
falsity. Because the relators provided proof of an objective falsehood that
patients were not terminally ill, CMS paid for services that were not
reasonable and necessary.136 That alone warrants FCA liability because
the person submitted “a false or fraudulent claim for payment or
approval.”137 Had the Eleventh Circuit scrutinized these facts, it could
have found that AseraCare violated the FCA and determined the
government presented a triable issue. More importantly, the court could
have provided direction for lower courts to determine additional ways
hospice providers can legally falsify certifications and bill CMS. Instead,
the court simply ruled that, so long as reasonable doctors exercised
clinical judgments when making certifications, there is no falsehood.138
The Eleventh Circuit’s ruling may have created a paradox for the
government and relators.139 Because the government cannot solely rely
on expert testimony to show that hospice certifications were false, there
becomes an unenforceable legal rule.140 Consequently, the Eleventh
Circuit essentially granted hospice providers immunity from future

133. See AseraCare III, 938 F.3d at 1284-85 (stating the government built its case from a universe
of approximately 2,180 patients who received hospice care for 365 days and narrowing its sample size to
233 patients).
134. The author writes hundreds because if one expert opined that he would not have certified 123
of the 233 patients records, then a few experts could possibly opine that they would not have certified
hundreds of the approximate 2,180 patient records.
135. See 42 U.S.C. §1395y(a)(1)(C) (“no payment made be made under part A [of Medicare] . . .
for any expenses incurred for items or services—in the case of hospice care, which are not reasonable and
necessary for the palliation or management of terminal illness”).
136. For the AseraCare lawsuit, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) sought $67.5 million for
fraudulent claims for a total of $200 million because of the FCA’s treble damages. See Buck, infra note
140, at 26-27.
137. 31 U.S.C. §3729(a)(1)(A).
138. See Aseracare III, 938 F.3d at 1301(“[an] FCA claim fails as a matter of law if the plaintiff
proves nothing more than a reasonable difference of opinion as to the patient's prognosis”).
139. Isaac D. Buck, A Farewell to Falsity Shifting Standards in Medicare Fraud Enforcement, 49
SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 41 (2018) (arguing that by dismissing medical necessity-based FCA claims due
to a mere difference in clinical opinions between doctors, the DOJ could never prove that clinical opinions
were not deserving of medically necessary treatment).
140. Id. at 41-42.
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lawsuits.141 By reasoning clinical opinions for certification are complex
and not an exact science, the court’s ruling creates a high bar to prove
those certification were false and unnecessary. Although the Eleventh
Circuit’s holding leaves the government and relators a huge legal hurdle
to overcome, there might be hope for future claims.
D. The 2011 Amendments to Conditions and Limitations for Payment of
Services
Effective January 1, 2011, for each recertification after the patient’s
180th day of hospice care, the certifying physician must have a “face-toface encounter with the individual to determine continued eligibility of
the individual for hospice care.”142 The change in eligibility requirements
resulted from a March 2009 report issued by the Medicare Payment
Advisory Committee (MedPAC).143 MedPAC felt that the current MHB
payment system incentivized providers to improperly certify patients
because of the financial benefits of long-term hospice stays.144 Before the
change, there was little enforcement of regulatory compliance, but with
the 2011 changes, providers could only seek repayment for hospice
services if they conducted a face-to-face visit and provided a brief
narrative for the certification.145
The 2011 addition is important because the initial AseraCare lawsuit
arguably hinged on the reasons why MedPAC recommended changes.
AseraCare did not require physicians to conduct face-to-face encounters
to recertify patients; instead, physicians could make clinical judgments
based on all the clinical information and supporting documentation. Had
AseraCare been required to conduct these face-to-face encounters for the
third certification period,146 AseraCare’s providers would have had to
familiarize themselves with patients’ records and provide a brief narrative
for why certification was still proper. With those procedures in place and
141. See Aseracare III, 938 F.3d at 1301 (Government arguing that the legal standard would create
an under-inclusive problem because hospice providers with sloppy or improper certification procedures
could evade FCA liability so long as they can assert their physicians’ clinical judgments were justifiable).
See also Buck, supra note 140 at 30 (arguing so long as hospice providers present a reasonable clinical
disagreement about certification, they will be immunized from FCA enforcement and liability).
142. 42 U.S.C. §1395f(a)(7)(D)(i)(I); 42 C.F.R. §418.22(b)(3)(v).
143. MedPAC March 2009 report, supra note 132, at 350, Recommendation 6-2A.
144. See id. at 348-49 (providing that certification requirements and payment reform was
imperative because current MHB lacked adequate administrative and other controls to check incentives
for longs stays and CMS lacked data vital to the effective management of MHB. By reforming the
certification process, MHB could have more oversight for regulatory compliance to reduce unnecessary
CMS expenditure).
145. 42 C.F.R. §418.22(b).
146. The face-to-face encounter would have occurred prior to the third certification period starting
on day 181.
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documents recorded, when providers went to recertify the patient for the
fourth or fifth time, they still would have had to review the medical
records and supply a brief narrative for the certification. If upon reviewing
the record the certifying physician found that no reasonable physician
would have initially certified the patient, relators could prove a type of
objective falsehood described by the Eleventh Circuit.147 Furthermore, the
failure to even record face-to-face encounters or brief narratives for
patients in the certification process would give rise to FCA liability under
the legally false certification theory.148 This hypothetical, however, and
most hospice FCA actions brought before 2011, will be resolved at the
summary judgement stage or likely be moot because of the changed
requirements for recertification.
E. Practical Implications
The Eleventh Circuit’s ruling may immunize hospice providers from
future FCA liability. Lawsuits filed before the 2011 changes will most
likely be resolved at the summary judgment stage because of the
hardships relators face when attempting to prove objective falsehood.149
So long as hospice providers can defend a reasonable disagreement about
the clinical judgment to certify patients, the providers will not be held
liable.150 In other words, the providers avoid liability because their
certifications are reasonable.151 Even if opposing experts disagree and
determine the certifications are false, making treatment unnecessary, then
hospice providers may still prevail on a motion for summary judgment
because the certification would be reasonable. This consequence of the
Eleventh Circuit’s approach has significant financial implications for the
government.
Granting hospice providers some level of immunity impedes the
government from collecting treble damages after a favorable verdict152 or
future settlement amounts. For example, the government alleged $67
million in fraudulent claims and sought a total of $200 million in damages

147. Additionally, by reviewing the record, the physician would have to familiarize herself with
the patient record.
148. The hospice providers would be liable for their failure to comply with regulatory
requirements. See 42 C.F.R. §418.22(b)(3)(v).
149. See generally the lower court decisions in AseraCare I, U.S. ex rel. Wall v. Vista Hospice
Care, Inc. and Druding v. Care Alternative, Inc. Also, hospice providers argued that all of their
certifications were proper, and to avoid treble damages, they arguably spared no expense to find an expert
to testify that no reasonable doctor would conclude that the certifications were medically improper.
150. See Buck, supra note 140, at 30.
151. Id. at 45 (arguing that the if the Eleventh Circuit adopts the district court’s holding, it will
immunize providers who “administer care that is not medically necessary, but ‘reasonable’ nonetheless”).
152. 31 U.S.C. §3729 (a)(1).
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from AseraCare.153 In the first trial, the jury returned a verdict for the
government, creating upwards of $200 million in liability for
AseraCare.154 But, the standard changed, and now the government will
have to satisfy a more robust burden of proof to recover damages.155 That
standard protects hospice providers from large damages and disincentives
providers from settling, as the chances of prevailing on a motion for
summary judgment may have increased.156
Additionally, the AseraCare III and Druding II cases seem to rely on
moot legal standards. The standard may be moot because there is lesser
need for relators to prove objective falsehood now.157 If any reviewing
physicians can see that the third or any subsequent certification was
improper because of the supporting medical records and narrative or lack
thereof, then there is no dispute of material fact. Instead, the hospice
provider plainly failed to comply with the statutory and regulatory
frameworks and is liable. Certainly, medical judgments still need to be
immune from judicial scrutiny,158 but FCA liability for hospice
certification weighs more heavily on regulatory compliance than actual
medical opinion.
In sum, the Eleventh Circuit’s adoption of the “objective falsehood”
standard presents the clearest framework for courts to determine whether
hospice certifications complied with regulations. However, the Eleventh
153. See Buck, supra note 140 at 26-27.
154. Gabriel Imperato, An Overview of Pervasive Allegations in Hospice and Home Health Fraud
Cases, 30 HEALTH LAW. 22, 23 (2018).
155. Note that in March 2020, AseraCare settled with the DOJ for $1 million. Scott R. Grubman,
Hospice Providers Remain Squarely in the Government’s Enforcement Crosshairs, 32 HEALTH LAW 25
(August 2020).
156. For examples of settlements please see e.g. James F. Barger, Jr., Life, Death, and Medicare
Fraud: The Corruption of Hospice and What the Private Public Partnership under the Federal False
Claims Act is Doing About It, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, Appendix (Winter 2016) (finding in 2012, Odyssey
Healthcare, Inc. settled for $25 million; in 2012 Harmony Care Hospice, Inc. settled for $1.29 million; in
2013, Hospice of the Comforter, Inc. settled for $3 million; in 2014, Serenity Hospice Care, LLC settled
for $581,504.46; in 2014, San Diego Hospice & Palliative Care Corp. settled for $1 million out of
bankruptcy proceeding; in 2015, Good Shepherd Hospice of Mid America settled for $4 million; in 2015,
Compassionate Care Hospice, Inc. settled for $6.672 million); See also Jacobowski, supra note 132, at
205-06 (finding in 2009, SouthernCare settled for $24.7 million and in 2006 Odyssey HealthCare, Inc.
settled for $12.9 million).
157. The exception here might be that no reasonable physician would have concluded the patient
was terminally ill. However, there is a lesser need for proof of objective falsehood because lawsuits can
only be brought when patients have outlived their 180-day prognosis. As Jacobowski wrote, in 2008, the
average length of stay was 69 days. See Jacobowski, supra note 132. By comparison, from 2014-2018,
the average length of stay rose from 88.2 days to 89.6 days, yet in 2018, only 14.1% of the 1.55 million
MHB patients needed hospice care for more than 180 days. See NHPCO, Facts and Figures, supra note
5, at Table 1 and Figure 12, p. 12. Given the percentage of individuals receiving care past 180 days
combined with the increased statutory requirements, the medical records and brief narratives supporting
recertification should objectively show if the initial certification and subsequent recertification were
reasonable and necessary.
158. Compare to text accompanying supra note 91.
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Circuit should have analyzed the certifications against the reasonable and
necessary aspects of the MHB. The court should have considered that if a
fifth recertification yields support that the initial certification was
unreasonable and unnecessary, the initial certification was false.
Additionally, the 2011 changes were adopted to reduce the financial
incentive for providers to certify patients ineligible for hospice
certification. Those changes may be a direct result of why the government
would ever intervene. Regardless, the Eleventh Circuit’s holding shields
hospice providers from future FCA litigation, decreases the government’s
changes of settling or winning at trial, and may even be a moot legal
standard.
V. CONCLUSION
Adjudication of hospice fraud under the FCA is still a developing body
of law. Only two circuits have decided the legal standard to resolve
motions for summary judgment in such cases, which have produced
divergent analyses and conflicting legal standards. Although the Third
Circuit holds that physicians’ clinical judgments are not immune from
judicial scrutiny, the court did not consider how providers legally falsified
the hospice certifications but instead ruled that a difference in medical
expert testimony creates a triable issue. Conversely, the Eleventh Circuit
held that a mere difference of opinions is not evidence of “objective
falsehood,” and without more, does not create an issue of material fact to
survive a motion for summary judgment. The Eleventh Circuit’s holding
protects the subjective nature of a physicians’ clinical judgments and
grants physicians deference when they certify a patient. The court
emphasized that estimating death is not an exact science, and thus it is
inappropriate to require jurors to consider differing expert opinions.
Additionally, proof of objective falsehood acknowledges Congress’s
authority to require more or less requirements for hospice certification.
Congress exercised that authority when in enacted changes in 2011. Now,
for the third and all subsequent recertification periods, providers must
have face-to-face encounters with patients and provide a brief write-up
for why certification is still proper. The 2011 changes will likely modify
FCA claims in the future. If providers fail to comply with regulations,
their failure can yield proof of an objective falsehood when analyzed
against the reasonable and necessary provision. More powerfully, if there
is lacking documentation in the medical records, then all subsequent
certifications would be false because the physician would have certified
a patient without clinical information and other documentation that
supports a prognosis of terminal illness. Nonetheless, the Eleventh
Circuit’s holding effectively grants some immunity to hospice providers
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against FCA liability and has the potential to greatly reduce the
government’s ability to collect damages for fraudulent claims. The author
believes the future of FCA liability will likely be governed by the
Eleventh Circuit’s holding, and how courts apply that legal standard to
the 2011 changes will present several other issues for determining hospice
fraud.
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